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Abstract 
 
 Can artworks be morally good or bad? Many philosophers have thought so. Does this 
  moral goodness or badness bear on how good or bad a work is as art? This is very 
much a   live debate. Autonomists argue that moral value is not relevant to artistic value; 
    interactionists argue that it is. In this paper I argue that the debate 
between interactionists   and autonomists has been conducted unfairly: all parties to the 
debate have tacitly     accepted a set of constraints which prejudices 
the issue against the interactionist. I identify  two demands which are routinely placed on ar-
guments seeking to establish interaction,   and argue that they are in fact mutually conflict-
ing. 
  
 There are two upshots. First: in light of this, it is unsurprising that arguments for   
  interaction have  failed to meet with everybody’s satisfaction. The constraints are 
such that  no argument can meet them. Second: recognising this helps us to uncover a new, 
    promising, but hitherto overlooked, strategy for establishing ar-
tistic-ethical interaction. 
 
Keywords: art and morality, artistic value 
 
Introduction 
 
Can artworks be morally good or bad? Many philosophers have thought so. Indeed, phi-
losophers working on the issue of morality in art in the past twenty years or so have been 
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almost unanimous that they can, citing examples such as Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi 
propaganda film Triumph of the Will and W. D. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation as particularly 
clear examples of morally bad artworks.1 
 
Outside of philosophy, it is not hard to find examples of moral properties being attributed 
to artworks. Consider the 2012 film, The Help, a well-intentioned film about racism in 
America in the 1960s, which has sparked debate about whether it is itself racist. The Asso-
ciation of Black Women Historians released a statement about it, in which they argue that: 
 
 Despite efforts to market the book and the film as a progressive story of triumph over 
  racial injustice, The Help distorts, ignores, and trivializes the experiences of black 
domestic  workers. We are specifically concerned about the representations of black life and 
the lack   of attention given to sexual harassment and civil rights activism.2 
Examples such as these suggest that there is at least a pre-theoretic tendency to take art-
works to be susceptible to moral, as well as aesthetic and artistic, assessments. Within phi-
losophy, and outside of it, there is (perhaps surprisingly) little controversy on the issue of 
whether moral goodness and badness can be properly attributed to artworks. The question 
that has really divided opinion is the further question of whether this moral goodness or 
badness is relevant to the goodness or badness of these works as art. Suppose The Help is, 
despite the writers’ intentions, racist. Does this make it a less good film? Does this make it 
less good as art? Or should we say instead that it is bad in one respect - ethically - but when 
it comes to assessing it in a different respect - artistically - facts about its ethical value are 
neither here nor there? It is this, second, question to which the present paper is directed. 
 
                                                 
1 See Devereaux (1998), esp. pp. 227-256.  Walton (1994); Dickie (2005); Gaut (1998), p. 182; Gaut (2007) 
esp. pp. 228-252; Carroll (2000) esp. pp. 374-381; Harold (2006); Anderson & Dean (1998); Kieran (1996) 
esp. pp. 346-349; Eaton, (2012) esp. p. 289. 
2 http://www.abwh.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2%3Aopen-statement-the-
help 
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Call the view that moral value is not relevant to artistic value autonomism; call the view 
that it is relevant interactionism.3 In this paper I argue that the debate between interaction-
ists and autonomists has been conducted unfairly: all parties to the debate have tacitly 
accepted a set of constraints which prejudices the issue against the interactionist. I identify 
two demands which are routinely placed on arguments seeking to establish interaction, 
and argue that they are in fact mutually conflicting. No argument can meet them both.  
 
There are two upshots. First: it renders it unsurprising that arguments for interaction have 
failed to meet with everybody’s satisfaction. The constraints are such that no argument 
can meet them. Second: recognising this helps us to uncover a new, promising, but hitherto 
overlooked, strategy for establishing artistic-ethical interaction. 
 
After some preliminary clarifications are made in Section 1, the paper comprises four main 
parts. Sections 2 and 3 identify the two assumptions that jointly result in an unfair playing 
field for the interactionist. In Section 4 I discuss which of these two incompatible assump-
tions should be rejected. I argue that there are in fact independent reasons for rejecting 
both. In Section 5 I say a bit about the ignored strategy, and why it looks promising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: Preliminaries 
 
1.1: Varieties of Interactionism 
                                                 
3 This follows a fairly established usage: see Stecker, Robert (2005), and (2010), Ch. 12; Lopes (2006); 
Harold (2011); Smuts (2011). Note that, like these authors, I do not intend the term ‘interactionism’ to 
convey anything specifically causal.  
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While my focus here is the debate between those who argue that moral value can bear on 
artistic value (interactionists) and those who argue that it cannot (autonomists), most in-
teractionists argue for some specific form of interactionism rather than just for interaction-
ism per se. In the now-standard terminology:4 ethicists and moderate moralists disagree 
about whether moral value bears on artistic value in every case (ethicism), or in only some 
(moderate moralism). Ethicists also disagree with immoralists about the direction of the 
bearing - (moderate) immoralists hold that moral flaws can be artistic merits (extreme im-
moralism - the view that moral flaws are always artistic merits - does not appear to be an 
occupied position).5 
 
While interactionists may disagree with each other about rather a lot, however, they are 
united in their commitment to what autonomism denies: that moral flaws and merits - at 
least sometimes - bear on artistic value, in one direction or another. The interactionist ar-
guments I discuss in what follows are each arguments for a particular species of interac-
tionism, but my focus here is on the debate between interactionists of all stripes, on one 
hand, and autonomists, on the other.  
 
1.2: Moral Properties  
Three related debates concerning moral and artistic evaluation fall outside the remit of this 
paper. First, metaethical and meta-aesthetic questions about how we should understand 
the evaluative terms ‘moral value’ and ‘artistic value’. Are they devices for reporting fea-
tures of the world, or do they serve only to report or express human attitudes? I will not 
here take a stand on this question here.6 
                                                 
4 This terminology originates from Noël Carroll’s helpful taxonomy. See Carroll, Noël (2000). Note that 
some philosophers urge a departure from the standard terminology. Giovanelli (2007) proposes a rather 
radical overhaul, and Gaut (2007) more modestly, proposes a slightly different understanding of the 
term ‘ethicism’. 
5 Those who argue for immoralism tend to make the weaker claim that moral flaws can be artistic mer-
its, not that they always are. See, for example, Kieran (2002); Jacobson (1997); John (2003); Eaton (2012). 
6 Most participants in the interactionism debate set aside these meta-evaluative questions. Presumably the thought 
is that however one understands ascriptions of ethical and artistic merit, as long as one agrees that it is legitimate 
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Second, there is a significant body of literature on what the moral character of an artwork 
consists in. The prevailing view is that the moral character of an artwork is a matter of the 
moral character of the attitudes manifested in the work.7 Alternative suggestions include 
the way the work was made,8 the consequences of engaging with the work,9 the purpose 
for which the work was made,10 the moral viewpoint of its actual, implied,11 or posited12 
author, and the extent to which it challenges its audience morally.13 What I go on to say in 
this paper is independent of how that debate is to be resolved.  
 
A third question is whether artworks are the kinds of things to which moral properties can 
legitimately be ascribed. This question can arise even if one is perfectly happy with ascrib-
ing moral properties to things more generally; one might simply worry that there is some 
kind of category mistake involved in ascribing moral properties to artworks. I noted above 
that it is standardly assumed that this is not a mistake. For the purpose of this paper, I will 
not challenge this assumption. 
 
1.3 Artistic Value 
                                                 
to make such ascriptions (i.e. barring error theories), the question of how these relate still arises. And this is so 
whether that legitimacy is cashed out in realist terms or otherwise. An exception is Harold (2011), who argues 
that metaethical, and metanormative questions do bear on the question, as metanormative antirealism 
entails autonomism. 
7 See Carroll (1996): pp. 232-234; Gaut (1998): p. 182; Jacobson (1997): p. 167. 
8 This suggestion is discussed (and rejected) in Stecker (2005), pp. 139-140, and Harold (2006), pp. 260-
261. 
9 See Posner (1997); Nussbaum (1990). See also Stecker (2005) and (2010), who distinguishes between 
‘micro’ and ‘macro’ consequences. 
10 This is discussed in Harold (2006), see p. 260.  
11 Booth (1988). 
12 Devereaux (2004). 
13 Harold (2006). These options need not be understood as exclusive. Some argue for just one of these to the ex-
clusion of the others (See, for example,  Gaut (1998), and (2001) esp. p. 432), but others take the moral charac-
ter of an artwork to have several potential sources (See Stecker (2005) for example; esp. pp. 139-140). If one 
takes the latter view, there may be not one but several interactionism questions, depending on which kind of moral 
properties of artworks one has in mind (Giovanelli (2007) makes this point; see pp. 120-121). In which case 
one could in theory be an interactionist about one kind of moral property but an autonomist about another. If that is 
the case - and I don’t take a stand either way here - then the claims I defend in what follows should be taken to ap-
ply to each one of these interactionism debates.  
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In addition to the question of whether the ethical value of an artwork is relevant to its 
artistic value, it is sometimes asked whether it is relevant to its aesthetic value. Depending 
on how ‘aesthetic value’ is understood, this second question may be the same as the first; 
some stipulate that by ‘aesthetic value’, they will mean artistic value.14 There is, however, 
a notable lack of consensus regarding how the term ‘aesthetic value’ should be understood. 
Where they can be read as different questions, then, the focus here is on the first. This is 
just the question of whether the ethical value of a work can affect how good it is as art.15  
 
 
SECTION 2: The First Dogma 
 
In this section I argue that the artistic-ethical interaction debate has proceeded as though 
all participants accept a certain constraint on the form that arguments for interaction 
should take.  
 
There are two kinds of strategy one could take to try to establish artistic-ethical interac-
tion. First, one could try to establish interaction indirectly, via some other property. In 
other words, argue as follows: 
 
(i) Identify some property P where either all parties to the debate already accept that 
P is relevant to artistic value, or where one can supply an argument for P’s rele-
vance to artistic value. 
(ii) Argue that the ethical character of an artwork bears on the extent to which it pos-
sesses P. 
                                                 
14 See Gaut (2007): pp. 26-42, Harold, James (2006): pp. 260. See also Vermazen, Bruce (1991): p. 266. 
15 Some philosophers have expressed scepticism about artistic value (see Lopes 2011). It is a presupposi-
tion of the interactionism debate - at least in its standard form - that such scepticism is mistaken. But for 
arguments against scepticism about artistic value, see Dodd (2014), Hanson (2013), (2017), Huddleston 
(2012), Stecker (2012).  
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(iii) Conclude that ethical value bears on artistic value, since it bears on P, and P bears 
on artistic value. 
 
The relation of ‘bearing on’ here is understood very broadly. A property could bear on 
artistic value in a constitutive sense, or in a causal sense. Call this kind of strategy an in-
direct strategy. since it is an attempt to secure the relevance of ethical value to artistic 
value indirectly, via some intermediary property.  
 
Second, one could try to establish interaction directly, without going via some intermedi-
ary property. Call such strategies direct strategies.  
 
Participants in the artistic-ethical interaction debate, as I shall argue, have proceeded as 
though the only kind of acceptable interactionist argument is the indirect kind. No one, 
to my knowledge, has pursued direct strategies. This is in marked contrast with the situ-
ation in parallel debates: debates concerning the artistic relevance of other kinds of prop-
erty, such as originality and cognitive value. In both of these debates, those who argue 
for interaction - and indeed, those who argue against interaction - frequently do so by ap-
pealing to what is often referred to as ‘critical and appreciative practice’.  
 
Harold Osborne argues for the irrelevance of originality to artistic value by appealing to 
our actual artistic appraisals: 
 There is an element of timelessness in our appraisals of artistic masterpieces.  Unlike  
  scientific theories, great works of art are not superseded and do not lose their value 
   when they are no longer new. We appreciate the memorable works of all 
ages without   knowing or greatly caring to what extent they were novel in their time.
16 
                                                 
16
 Osborne (1979)  
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Matthew Kieran, Oliver Conolly, and Bashar Haydar argue for the relevance of cognitive 
value to artistic value by appealing to critical practice:  
 Critics often do advert to considerations of truth in evaluating works as art. Critical terms 
  of praise or blame such as profound, insightful, sentimental, shallow, callow, often 
do pick  out the beliefs and attitudes conveyed through a work.17 
 Many of the terms we use to assess works of literature are cognitive in nature. We say that 
 a work is profound, insightful, shrewd, well-observed, or perceptive, and conversely that 
  it is shallow, or sentimental, or impercipient. A common thread running through-
out this   terminology is that works of literature are ascribed cognitive features affecting the 
value   of those works qua literature. Use of this terminology therefore implies adherence 
to a   substantial philosophical theory, cognitivism, the thesis that (1) works of literature 
have   cognitive content, and (2) this content enhances their value as works of literature.18 
And Gordon Graham argues for cognitivism from its ability ʻto explain and justify a range 
of artistic appraisalsʼ19  
 
These are all examples of direct strategies because they try to establish the artistic relevance 
of some target property without going via an intermediary property. Instead, they appeal 
to critical and appreciative practice and claim to find evidence there that the target prop-
erty bears on artistic value. In each case, the argument involves no claims about the rele-
vance of anything else, besides the target property, to artistic value. 
 
Is appealing to critical and appreciative practice a good way to argue? Is it the only way 
of arguing directly, or are there other ways? These are further questions, and I’ll say more 
                                                 
17 Kieran (2009): at p. 196.  
18 Conolly & Haydar (2007): p. 111. 
19 Graham (2005): p. 72. 
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about them in §4. The point to note for now that arguments of this kind are commonplace 
in debates about cognitive-artistic interaction, and about the interaction of originality with 
artistic value. In the remainder of this section I will argue that this is not true of the artistic-
ethical interaction debate: I will talk through four much-discussed arguments offered by 
philosophers in support of artistic-ethical interaction, and show how they all qualify as 
indirect strategies. 
 
 
2. 1: The Uptake Argument 
 
Noël Carroll’s uptake argument is intended to establish the truth of what Carroll calls 
‘Moderate Moralism’, the thesis that the ethical value of an artwork at least sometimes 
affects that work’s artistic merit.20 Narrative artworks, Carroll argues, very often solicit re-
sponses from their audiences: the fictional events are often presented in ways that are de-
signed to get the audience to have a particular kind of emotional response. But artworks 
can be better or worse designed in this respect. Works don’t always get the audience re-
sponses that they solicit. Works can be unconvincing, or strike their audience as manipu-
lative, characters that are designed to be sympathetic might fail to win audiences over. 
 
Carroll argues that, in general, we ought to find uncontroversial the claim that when an 
artwork fails to get its audience to respond in the way solicited, this constitutes an artistic 
flaw in the work in question. This has some prima facie plausibility. Take Oscar Wilde’s 
famous criticism of Dickens’s The Old Curiosity Shop, that ‘one must have a heart of stone 
                                                 
20 See Carroll (2000), esp. pp. 377-378, and (1998a). It is worth noting that Carroll in fact frames his argu-
ment in terms of aesthetic merit, and it may be that he intends this to be understood as distinct from ar-
tistic merit. If that’s the case, then the argument I am focussing on is not strictly Carroll’s, but rather an 
argument that has been widely attributed to him (see, for example, Davies (2007) pp. 173-182; Kieran  
(2006), esp. p. 134, John (2003), esp. pp. 332-334). Little hangs on this for my purposes, however, since 
the argument I am discussing has been hugely influential in the literature, and merits discussion, even if 
strictly speaking it is not the argument Carroll intended to make.  
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to read the death of little Nell without laughing.’21 Most people understand this to be an 
artistic criticism of the work. One can’t claim of a narrative work that a scene central to it 
that was supposed to be deeply sad and poignant, is in fact hilarious, without thereby 
saying something that bears negatively on an overall assessment of the work’s artistic 
merit.  
 
Call the ability of an artwork to get the responses from its audience that it solicits, the 
ability to secure uptake. The claim, then, is that the failure of an artwork to secure uptake is 
an artistic flaw. Carroll’s key move is to argue that if we accept this, we ought to accept 
that moral flaws can detract from a work’s artistic value, since moral flaws are sometimes 
what prevent works from securing audience uptake. Carroll takes Brett Easton Ellis’s novel 
American Psycho to illustrate this point: 
 
 The author intended it as a satire of the rapacious eighties in the USA. He presented  a 
  serial killer as the symbol of the vaunted securities marketeer of Reagonomics. 
However,   the serial killings depicted in the novel are so graphically brutal that read-
ers are not able   morally to get past the gore in order to savour the parody.22 
 
American Psycho fails to secure audience uptake because of its moral flaws. And so, argues 
Carroll, since failing to secure uptake is an artistic flaw, the novel is artistically flawed 
because morally flawed. 
 
What I’m interested in here is not whether Carroll’s argument works or not, but rather the 
structure of the argument. The uptake argument is an indirect strategy, since it proceeds 
by identifying a property that it argues is relevant to artistic value - in this case the ability 
to secure uptake - and then argues that ethical value can affect it. 
                                                 
21 Cited in Ellmann (1987): p. 441. 
22 Carroll (1996): p. 232. 
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2.2: The Merited Response Argument 
 
Berys Gaut’s Merited Response Argument is superficially similar to the uptake argument, 
but importantly different. Here the intermediary property is not the ability to actually se-
cure uptake, but what Gaut calls the meriting of uptake. Gaut argues that what matters to 
artistic value is that the responses the work prescribes from its audience are merited. He 
argues that a horror film may be unscary or a joke unfunny, whether or not people in fact 
respond with the prescribed fear or hilarity respectively.23 And in such cases, the work is 
guilty of prescribing a response that it doesn’t merit. Gaut thinks we should agree that this 
is an artistic flaw, and takes his task, then, to be to show that immoral responses are never 
merited. 
 
Again, what I want to draw attention to here is the structure of Gaut’s argument. Despite 
the difference in content, it is similar in form to Carroll’s uptake argument in the following 
way: Gaut is attempting to establish the artistic relevance of ethical value by arguing that: 
 
(i) meritedness of prescribed response is relevant to artistic value, and 
(ii)  ethical value affects meritedness of prescribed response. 
 
 
 
2.3: The Moral Beauty Argument 
 
                                                 
23 See Gaut (1998), and (2007): p. 231. 
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The Moral Beauty Argument, also from Berys Gaut, is a very different argument for artis-
tic-ethical interaction. Here the starting point is the claim that one particular species of 
beauty is moral beauty. Artworks that are morally meritorious, it is claimed, exhibit moral 
beauty, and artworks that are morally bad exhibit a corresponding moral ugliness. So, for 
example, the racism that makes Birth of a Nation morally bad is also a way in which it is 
ugly. So, insofar as we accept that beauty is an artistic merit, and ugliness a demerit, we 
should accept, argues Gaut, that the moral value of an artwork affects its artistic value, 
since moral value is a kind of beauty, and beauty is relevant to artistic value.24 
 
Here the intermediary property is beauty. Gaut is arguing that the ethical character of a 
work bears on its artistic value because it bears on its beauty, and beauty bears on artistic 
value. 
 
You might, nonetheless, be tempted to classify this as a direct argument: it is claiming, 
after all, that moral merits are a species of beauty (and that moral flaws are a species of 
ugliness), not merely that the moral character of a work affects its beauty - but rather that 
the moral character can constitute a kind of beauty.  
 
But this is mistaken. It is not a necessary condition on an argument’s qualifying as indirect 
that the links it draws to the intermediary property must be merely causal, or that they 
cannot be constitutive ones. What makes an argument qualify as an indirect strategy is 
that it tries to establish the bearing of some target property on artistic value by drawing a 
link from that target property to some intermediary property, and drawing another link from the 
intermediary property to artistic value. The links in question can be causal, constitutive, or 
whatever. What matters is that the case for the target property’s artistic relevance is made 
in terms of links of some kind to the intermediary property.  
                                                 
24 See Gaut (2007): pp. 114-132. 
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2.4: Cognitivist Arguments 
 
The last kind of interactionist argument I will discuss comprises a group of arguments 
which I will call cognitivist arguments. Berys Gaut, James Harold, Matthew Kieran, and 
Noël Carroll have suggested cognitivist arguments for moderate moralism;25 Matthew 
Kieran has also put forward a cognitivist argument for (moderate) immoralism.26  
 
The arguments all begin with the cognitivist claim that if an artwork has cognitive value - 
if it enhances our understanding of something - then this is an artistic merit. And then, 
depending on whether it is moderate moralism or immoralism that is being argued for, it 
is then argued that moral merits, or flaws, can help a work to achieve this. 
 
On the moralist side, it is argued that richly detailed narrative artworks can shed light on 
important moral issues and teach us significant moral truths, by making us imaginatively 
engage with certain morally relevant possibilities. For Gaut, the novel Sophie’s Choice 
‘shows us that moral life can present acute, irresolvable dilemmas, and so teaches us some-
thing very significant about morality - and something denied by some philosophers such 
as Kant.’27 
 
If, as cognitivism maintains, cognitive value bears positively on artistic value, and if moral 
merits can enhance a work’s cognitive value, then we have an argument for the claim that 
the moral merits of a work at least sometimes bear positively on its artistic value. 
 
                                                 
25 Gaut  Art, Emotion and Ethics, esp. pp. 133-202; Carroll (1998b), pp. 126–160; Harold, J. (2008); and 
Kieran, M. (1996). 
26 Kieran (2002). 
27 Gaut (2007), pp. 163-4. See also Carroll (1998b) and Harold (2008). 
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On the immoralist side, it is argued that there is one kind of cognitive benefit that immoral 
artworks are especially, possibly uniquely, well-placed to give us. The thought is that a 
well-rounded understanding of the good must involve an understanding of the potential 
appeal of the morally bad. Of course one, non-ideal, way of achieving this is to do morally 
bad things oneself, but, the immoralist argues, another way is to engage with artworks 
that encourage morally bad responses. Graham Greene’s The Destructors, to use one of 
Matthew Kieran’s examples, skilfully seduces readers into cheering along a fictional gang 
of teenagers in the destruction of a kind widower’s house. Kieran argues that this makes 
The Destructors a morally flawed work, but that this moral flaw is also what is responsible 
for the insight offered into how someone can be tempted into doing morally bad things. 
Putting this together with the cognitivist claim that this insight is an artistic merit, we ar-
rive at immoralism: moral flaws can be artistic merits. 
 
In both cases moral flaws or merits are claimed to bear on artistic value by bearing on 
cognitive value, which in turn affects artistic value. Such cognitivist arguments, like the 
other arguments we’ve discussed, are indirect strategies since they try to establish the rel-
evance of ethical value to artistic value via cognitive value. 
 
I’ve discussed the four main kinds of argument for ethical-artistic interaction and I’ve ar-
gued that all of them are indirect strategies: they try to establish the relevance of ethical 
value to artistic value via some intermediary property. Given the use of direct strategies 
in other, parallel, debates such as those concerning the artistic relevance of cognitive value 
and artistic value, the failure to explore direct strategies here cries out for explanation. A 
very plausible explanation is that people are implicitly accepting one of the following as a 
constraint: 
 
 IND: the only acceptable kinds of arguments for interaction are indirect              
 strategies. 
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 IND*: indirect strategies are preferable to direct ones.  
 
One consideration in favour of attributing a commitment to IND: some philosophers come 
very close to explicitly voicing a commitment to IND. Berys Gaut, for example, argues that 
appealing to critical and appreciative practice cannot succeed in establishing interaction. 
If it turns out that appealing to critical and appreciative practice is the only way to argue 
directly, then this amounts to a statement of IND.28 
 
On the other hand, one reason it’s plausible to think people in the debate subscribe to IND* 
is that indirect strategies have an attractive feature: they promise to shed some light on 
how the artistic-ethical interaction works. If successful, they do more than just establish 
artistic-ethical interaction; they also tell us something about the nature of the interaction. 
If Carroll’s uptake argument succeeds, it tells us not just that an artwork’s ethical character 
can affect its artistic value, but that it does so by affecting the work’s ability to secure au-
dience uptake; if Kieran’s cognitive immoralist argument succeeds, it does more than just 
establish that moral flaws can increase an artwork’s artistic value, but that they can do so 
by providing important psychological insights. If people in the debate are impressed by 
the potential of indirect strategies to be illuminating in this way, and if in addition they 
notice that indirect strategies aren't as readily available in the parallel debates, this would 
explain why direct strategies are pursued in those debates and not in the artistic-ethical 
interaction debate.  
 
A commitment to IND, or the weaker IND*, constitutes what I’m calling the first dogma 
of the artistic ethical interactionism debate. 
 
                                                 
28 Gaut (2007), pp. 90-106. 
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SECTION 3: The Second Dogma 
 
The second dogma is encapsulated in an influential objection to a major interactionist ar-
gument, Noël Carroll’s Uptake Argument, discussed above. Recall that the Uptake Argu-
ment starts from the claim that ability to secure uptake is relevant to artistic value, and 
then tries to establish that ethical value can affect ability to secure uptake. In the terminol-
ogy introduced in §2, it is an indirect strategy that uses ability to secure audience uptake 
as an intermediary property. 
 
Various objections have been raised to the Uptake Argument.29 Here, however, I want to 
focus on a particular objection that has been unanimously accepted by those who discuss 
it - which I will call the Qua Problem.30  
 
The objection, in short, is that Carroll’s argument does not show that ‘a moral problem qua 
moral problem is an artistic defect in an artwork.’31 This objection was first presented by 
James Anderson and Jeffrey Dean in their paper ‘Moderate Autonomism’, where they ar-
gue against Carroll that: 
 
 Whilst he may have shown that in some cases a moral problem in a work can prevent its 
  audience from engaging in the way the work requires, and that this is an artistic 
flaw […]   this is not sufficient since it is not the moral problem qua moral problem 
that is detracting   from artistic value, but rather the moral problem qua barrier to 
audience uptake. 
 
                                                 
29 See, for example, Davies, (2007), p. 173; Connolly (2000). 
30 See, for example, Dickie (2005); Kieran (2005): pp. 26-7; and Harold (2011): p. 140. , Connolly (2000), 
esp. pp. 305-306 
31 Anderson & Dean (1998): p. 157. 
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In other words, ‘the moral features qua moral features play no direct role. […] Rather, they 
are significant only in so far as they block an audience’s responses to the work’32 
 
The objection is also made by Matthew Kieran: 
 
 Objects can have multiple aims. A gun, for example, can be made both to function well as 
  a gun and to be highly decorative. Now in certain cases it may be that the overly 
elaborate  nature of the decoration may impair the ability of the gun to function as a gun - the 
    baroque decoration may weigh the object down too heavily, the 
detail may stop the     mechanism from working properly, and so on. 
But this does not show that as such the   nature of the decoration is relevant to evaluating 
the nature of the object qua gun. All it   shows is that sometimes other aspects of the ob-
ject may impinge on its capacity to     function in this way. It is not in-
ternal to evaluating things as guns that decoration as such be  taken into account.33  
 
By the same token, it is argued, even if Carroll is right that a work’s moral features can 
impinge on its ability to secure audience uptake, and even if he’s right that uptake is rele-
vant to artistic value, this does not establish that it is internal to the evaluation of an object 
qua artwork that ethical value as such be taken into account. 
 
The complaint, I take it, is this: to establish interaction in any interesting sense we need to 
do more than Carroll’s argument has done - we need to show that moral features qua moral 
features are relevant to artistic value. All that Carroll’s argument shows, however, is that 
moral features qua something else are relevant: a moral feature is relevant only insofar as it 
also qualifies as an inhibitor of uptake.  
 
This, then, is the second dogma that has shaped the interactionism debate: 
                                                 
32 Kieran (2001): p. 26. 
33 Kieran (2001): pp. 26-7. 
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 The Qua Constraint: any successful argument for interactionism must do more 
  than just show that moral properties are relevant to artistic value; it must 
show   that they are relevant qua moral properties.   
 
I am not going to take a stand here on whether the Qua constraint should be accepted. 
Rather, my concern is to point out that one definitely cannot accept it if one also accepts 
IND or IND*. 
 
It is because Carroll’s strategy is an indirect one that the Qua Problem objection can be 
made. Any attempt to establish the relevance of moral value to artistic value in this indirect 
way - by establishing the relevance of moral value to some intermediary property that is 
argued to be relevant to artistic value - is vulnerable to the objection that it is ‘not the moral 
value qua moral value’ that is doing the work. If the Qua Problem is a problem, then, it is 
not a problem particular to Carroll’s account, but rather a problem for indirect strategies 
in general.  
 
Gaut’s Merited Response argument, in linking moral flaws to artistic value via the claim 
that moral flaws make a response unmerited, can by the same token be charged with es-
tablishing the artistic relevance of moral flaws only qua things that make a prescribed response 
unmerited. The moralist cognitivist argument establishes the relevance of moral flaws qua 
cognitive demerits and of moral merits qua cognitive merits. The immoralist cognitivist argu-
ment establishes the relevance of moral flaws qua cognitive merits. The Moral Beauty argu-
ment establishes the relevance of moral merits qua beautiful features, and of moral flaws qua 
ugly features. 
 
Someone might object here that this is too quick. As I argued in §2, indirect strategies can 
draw constitutive, rather than merely causal, links between the relevant properties. Take 
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the moral beauty argument. On one reading, at least, it takes moral flaws to constitute a 
kind of ugliness, which in turn they take to constitute a kind of artistic flaw. And indirect 
arguments of this kind might be thought to avoid the Qua Problem.  
 
This is mistaken. To the extent that it’s a fair criticism of the uptake argument that it’s not 
the immorality that’s doing the work, it’s also applicable to the moral beauty argument: if 
moral flaws weren’t ugly, then they wouldn’t be artistic flaws. The QP is not a complaint 
that no link has been established between moral flaws and artistic flaws - the complaint is that 
it’s not the right kind of link. Specifically - the complaint is that the link is in some sense 
conditionalised on moral flaws counting as some other thing, P. That it is only insofar as/to 
the extent that/in virtue of the fact that a moral flaw is a P, that moral flaws bear on artistic 
value. In other words, the link between moral flaws and artistic flaws is in some sense 
conditionalised on their being Ps (and conditionalised, also, on Ps being artistic flaws). But 
even if the link between moral flaws and P is constitutive rather than, say, causal, the result 
is still a thesis about the bearing of moral flaws on artistic value that is conditionalised on 
moral flaws being Ps.  
 
It’s a further question, of course, whether this conditionalisation really does, as the QP 
assumes, render the link not of the right kind. But the point here is that if the Qua Problem 
is a problem at all, it is a problem for all of these arguments, and moreover, it is so precisely 
because they are indirect strategies. The moral is this: we shouldn’t be surprised that no 
satisfactory interactionist argument has been found if we insist that to be acceptable, inter-
actionist arguments must be both indirect and avoid the Qua Problem. No argument can 
do this; the requirements are incompatible. One of these two constraints, therefore, must 
be rejected. 
 
 
SECTION 4: Where to go from here? 
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I’ve argued that we should either start taking direct strategies seriously, or reject the Qua 
Constraint. Which course of action should we favour? My focus in what follows will be to 
argue that we should start taking direct strategies seriously. Note, however, that this 
doesn’t commit me to retaining the Qua Constraint. It may be that both features of the 
debate need to change. What I want to argue now, however, is that whether or not the Qua 
Constraint is rejected, the failure to explore direct strategies threatens to make the auton-
omist’s task easier than it should be, and the interactionist’s task harder: anyone who holds 
that direct strategies don’t need to be considered is prejudicing the issue against the inter-
actionist, even if they also reject the Qua Constraint. 
 
We’ve already seen a prima facie reason to be suspicious of the neglect of direct strategies 
in the art-ethics debate: these strategies are pursued with respect to other parallel ques-
tions - such as the questions about cognitive value and originality. But this is far from a 
full argument - it just establishes that those who think that direct strategies are not worth 
pursuing in the art-ethics case owe some explanation. Here I present a more conclusive 
reason to doubt that a restriction to indirect strategies here would be justified. I argue that 
such a restriction prejudices the debate against the interactionist. 
 
If the interactionist’s aim is to show that ethical value affects artistic value, then pursuing 
indirect strategies exclusively has the effect of restricting her options to showing that eth-
ical value affects something else that affects artistic value (be that the ability to secure up-
take, the meritedness of the prescribed responses, the cognitive value, or something else). 
Sure, that is a way of ethical value affecting artistic value; but it’s not the only way that it 
could. The other way would be for ethical value to be one of the things on the same level 
as the ability to secure uptake, the meritedness of the prescribed responses, and so on. In 
other words, there is the possibility that ethical value affects artistic value, not by affecting 
something else that affects artistic value, but directly. Both parties to the debate on ethical-
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artistic interaction have proceeded as though they implicitly assume, unfairly to the inter-
actionist, that this avenue is closed off, that the answer to that question is ‘no’. It is remark-
able that interactionists have let this go unchallenged. 
 
The assumption that only indirect strategies are acceptable would significantly limit, with-
out argument, the options for arguing that the interaction in question does happen.  
 
But why, it might be protested, should we think there is, even in principle, this other pos-
sibility? I argue that we are in fact committed to the claim that some properties have this 
status. Two arguments can be given that show that this is the case: one is that denial of this 
as an in principle possibility leads to infinite regress; the other is that there is at least one 
example which is standardly taken to realise this possibility. If we are committed to saying 
that some properties have this status, there is a genuine question about whether ethical 
value does. 
 
 
The argument from infinite regress 
 
First, if we think there is a question at all of whether some property affects artistic value, 
we are committed to the claim that some properties do so directly. Even indirect strategies 
presuppose that some properties are directly relevant to artistic value. If property A affects 
artistic value, it must do so either by affecting some other property that is relevant to ar-
tistic value, or by affecting artistic value directly. If it does so by affecting some other prop-
erty, B, we can then ask whether property B affects artistic value directly or via some other 
property, C. Each time we resist claiming that the property in question affects artistic value 
directly, we do so by invoking another property, about which the same question may be 
asked. For this form of explanation to be successful, there must be some property at the 
end of the chain that affects artistic value directly - otherwise we have an infinite regress 
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of artistically relevant properties, each of whose artistic relevance is explained in terms of 
another artistically relevant property.  So, on pain of infinite regress, some properties must 
be directly relevant to artistic value. 
 
 
The argument from examples 
 
There is at least one property that philosophers unanimously take to be directly relevant 
to artistic value, and that is aesthetic value. This claim needs some explicating, given that, 
as pointed out above, the term ‘aesthetic value’ has a number of different usages. This issue 
is perhaps further obscured by the fact that some philosophers use the term ‘aesthetic 
value’ as, by stipulation, synonymous with ‘artistic value’.34 On this latter usage, the claim 
that aesthetic value is relevant to artistic value would, of course, be trivially true; but other 
ways of using the term are such that any link to artistic value would be substantive. Some, 
for example, use the term in a way that is linked to a certain kind of experience;35 others 
use it as a term for beauty and related notions;36 others, still, take it to be linked to the form 
of something, or to its perceptual characteristics.37 What is noteworthy is that in all of these 
cases, there is a consensus that some property that’s plausibly denoted by ‘aesthetic value’ 
is relevant to artistic value. And moreover, this is does not appear to be dependent on 
taking it to be relevant to some other artistically relevant property. 
 
Of course, there is disagreement about whether aesthetic value is the whole story with re-
spect to artistic value, or whether more besides the aesthetic is artistically relevant. Some, 
for example, argue that cognitive value is not properly categorised under the aesthetic, but 
                                                 
34 Gaut (2007): pp. 26-42, Harold (2006): pp. 260; Vermazen (1991), p. 266. 
35 See Beardsley (1962): p. 620; Budd (2002): p. 14; Stecker (2005): p. 139. 
36 Zangwill (1998): p. 75. 
37 Eaton (2004). 
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is relevant to the assessment of artworks as art. Others argue that ‘aesthetic value’ properly 
construed, is broad enough to encompass cognitive value.38 What is striking, though, is 
that - however ‘aesthetic value’ is construed - the claim that aesthetic value is at least one 
factor relevant to artistic value is rarely disputed.  
 
The point here is that standardly at least one property is taken to be relevant to artistic 
value in a way that doesn’t hinge on its relevance to something else. Hence we already do 
recognise that it is an in principle possibility for a property to be directly relevant to artistic 
value (since in at least one case, we already take this possibility to be realised). Given this, 
it is at least an intelligible question whether ethical value is also one such property. 
 
 
Alternative Methodologies? 
 
The argument from infinite regress and the argument from examples show, in different 
ways, that we must allow that some properties affect artistic value directly. Given this, we 
must recognise that there is a genuine question of whether ethical character is one such 
property. This question, moreover, is one to which indirect strategies are unable to speak, 
since they can show at most that ethical character affects artistic value via affecting some 
other artistically relevant property. 
 
If this is correct, if there is this other possibility for how ethical value could interact with 
artistic value, how would one go about showing that such a possibility obtains, or doesn’t 
obtain? How could we show that ethical value bears on artistic value, if we’re not doing it 
via other things we already agree bear on artistic value? 
 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Lopes (2011). 
 24 
The first thing to say is that the plausibility of my claim in no way hinges on the prospects 
of a workable answer being provided to this methodological question. My central point is 
this: there is a genuine question: is ethical value something that affects artistic value with-
out affecting something else that does? Sure, there is a methodological issue of how one 
should go about answering that question. One thing that definitely doesn’t look like a re-
spectable answer to this question, though, is, ‘oh, we’ll just have to assume that it is not’. 
And that is what, effectively, has been done up till now. Thus, even if it is unclear how the 
claim - of any given property - that it directly bears on artistic value, is to be established, 
the fact remains that there are at least some properties of which this claim would be true.  
 
One suggestion, though there may be others, considers looking at what happens with re-
spect to those questions where indirect arguments are not the only kinds of arguments that 
are made. Looking at direct strategies in parallel debates in Section 2, we saw that they 
tend to appeal to critical and appreciative practice - to the art-critical judgements we in 
fact make. (Do we tend to rate a work more highly as art on the basis of its originality? Do 
we tend to take cognitive value to bear positively on our overall assessment of a work?). 
So why not do this in the case of ethical value? Why not ask: do we tend to take ethical 
value as relevant when assessing a work’s overall artistic merit? 
 
One worry: does this just assume that everyone’s art-critical judgements are right? Would 
this just ignore the possibility of making a mistake?  There are three things to say to this. 
 
First, the claim is not that if people in fact treat ethical value as relevant, that conclusively 
proves that it is relevant. It’s rather that, as a methodological principle, we should try to 
adopt a theory that is in accordance with what we, pre-theoretically, think on an issue; of 
course, if it turns out that such a theory runs into problems, we reject it, but we should try 
to avoid adopting a theory that is radically revisionary if we don’t have to; that is, unless 
there are significant theoretical benefits to doing so. 
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Second, the strategy of consulting our critical and appreciative practice is used rather a lot 
in parallel debates, as discussed, so if there’s a problem with it for the ethical value debate, 
then there would be a problem with it in these other debates too. 
 
Third, we should think about what reasons we could give for our rather dearly held belief, 
discussed above, that aesthetic value bears on artistic value. If it turns out these reasons all 
involve appeal to critical and appreciative practice, then we must either consider revising 
this belief about aesthetic value, or reconsider our scepticism about appeals to critical and 
appreciative practice.  
 
 
SECTION 5: Why direct strategies look promising for interactionism 
 
I’ve argued that direct strategies should be taken more seriously in the debate about the 
artistic relevance of ethical value. In other cases where direct strategies are employed, the 
particular direct strategies used involve appeals to critical and appreciative practice.  
 
It seems to me (although I’m not going to try to demonstrate this conclusively here) that if 
these kinds of strategies are pursued in the art-ethics debate, lots of plausible arguments 
for ethicism start to emerge. Here are two - fairly speculative - reasons to think that this is 
the case. Let’s look again at the arguments we cited about the artistic relevance of original-
ity and cognitive value. 
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First, consider again the arguments used by Kieran and Conolly and Haydar. They argued 
that the use of cognitive terms (such as ‘profound’, ‘insightful’, well-observed’) in art-crit-
icism supports the thesis that cognitive considerations are relevant to artistic value.39 Can 
a parallel argument be run for ethical value? I think the answer is clearly affirmative. There 
are plenty of critical terms that have an ethical component. In fact, most of the terms used 
here (sentimental, shallow, insightful) are examples; but consider also ‘sensitive’, ‘hu-
mane’, ‘big-hearted’; and on the other hand, ‘cruel’, ‘voyeuristic’.  
 
Second, let’s look again also at Harold Osborne’s argument against originality being rele-
vant to artistic value. He argued that it is not relevant because: 
 We appreciate the memorable works of all ages without knowing or greatly caring to what 
 extent they were novel in their time.40 
 
Can a parallel argument be run in the ethical case? It seems that this would be significantly 
less plausible: ‘we appreciate the memorable works of all ages without knowing or greatly 
caring to what extent that are ethically sound’. On the contrary, we very often notice, and 
care deeply about the ethical character of a work. Our awareness of a work’s moral char-
acter figures in our appreciation kind of inescapably. 
 
These are, of course, speculative, but they do at least suggest that if arguments from critical 
and appreciative practice are admissible in the artistic-ethical interaction debate, there 
would be no shortage of evidence to draw on to support interactionism in this way. 
 
     * * * 
 
                                                 
39 Kieran (2009): p. 196; Conolly & Haydar (2007): p. 111. 
40 Osborne (1979). 
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To summarise, I’ve argued that interactionism about ethical value has been treated un-
fairly. The debate has proceeded as though the following are desiderata on arguments 
seeking to establish interactionism: 
 
 IND/IND*: the argument must be an indirect strategy / indirect strategies are to 
  be preferred.  
  
 QP: the argument must establish not only that ethical value bears on artistic  
 value, but that it does so qua ethical value and not qua something else. 
 
I argued that IND/IND* and QP are in fact incompatible. They can’t both be genuine de-
siderata, because no argument can meet both of them. At least one must be rejected. More-
over, I argued that there are independent reasons why IND/IND* could not be a genuine 
desidaratum: treating it as a desideratum would essentially involve arbitrarily ruling out 
an entire kind of way that ethical value could be artistically relevant. I then gave some - 
fairly speculative - reasons for thinking that the prospects for interactionism look pretty 
rosy once we stop behaving as though the only available arguments are indirect strategies.  
 
Whether or not this last, speculative, line of thought is persuasive, however, the prospects 
for interactionism look at least rosier than they initially appeared. We’ve seen that way the 
playing field is ordinarily set up guarantees that interactionism cannot be established; by 
identifying this, and putting it right, we’ve shown the interactionism is in a better position 
than ordinarily appreciated.41 
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